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Abstract
Scientific realism holds that the terms in our scientific theories refer and that we
should believe in their existence. This presupposes a certain understanding of quan-
tification, namely that it is ontologically committing, which I challenge in this paper.
I argue that the ontological loading of the quantifiers is smuggled in through restrict-
ing the domains of quantification, without which it is clear to see that quantifiers are
ontologically neutral. Once we remove domain restrictions, domains of quantifica-
tion can include non-existent things, as they do in scientific theorizing. Scientific
realism would therefore require redefining without presupposing a view of onto-
logically committing quantification.
Introduction
In modern classical logic we cite the existential (or particular) quan-
tifier ∃ as meaning ‘there exists an…’ and as such quantification is a
mark of ontological commitment. Yet, in the words of Priest, ‘the
view that the particular quantifier is ‘existentially loaded’ is a rela-
tively new one historically and… it has become entrenched in
modern philosophical logic for less than happy reasons’.1 Not only
is it entrenched in philosophical logic but also in the philosophy of
science, where the debate over scientific realism presupposes that
quantification is existentially loaded. In this paper I argue that ∃
should be read as ‘some’ (not ‘there exists’), and known as the ‘par-
ticular’ (not ‘existential’) quantifier, as quantification is existentially
neutral. I will do this by using Quine, our exemplar of a realist and
naturalist, to show that there is no legitimate justification for treating
quantification in this loaded way. I will describe Quine’s loading of
quantification via domain restriction, and attack elements of the
Quinean picture that lead to this restriction. I appeal to quantification
in natural and formal languages for evidence of their neutrality in
order to show that we should not take our domains of quantification
in our scientific theorizing to include all and only existent things. It is
1 Graham Priest, ‘The Closing of the Mind: How the particular quan-
tifier became existentially loaded behind our backs’,The Review of Symbolic
Logic 1.1 (2008), 42.
351
doi:10.1017/S0031819117000031 © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2017
First published online 17 April 2017
Philosophy 92 2017
inherent in the scientific realist position that we believe the ontology
provided to us through the successful reference of scientific terms in
our scientific theories, and so, in other words, the domain is supposed
to contain our ontology.2 If quantifying over such domains is not the
appropriate method for extracting our ontology, then scientific
realism appears to be false, or else is in need of redefining without
utilizing existentially loaded quantification. This shows the impact
that the philosophy of logic can have on scientific realism.
1. The Quinean Ontological Criterion
Quine, in his seminal paper ‘OnWhat There Is’ (1948), puts forward
a criterion for how to recognise the ontological commitments of a dis-
course, manifested via translation into classical first order predicate
calculus. Quine believes that we speak in an ontologically committing
way in natural language by the use of (what he sees as quantifica-
tional) idioms like ‘there exists’ or ‘there are’. He is careful to stipulate
that it is only those uses of quantificational idioms made seriously
with regard to our best scientific theory that will be the assertions to
whose ontology we ought to regard ourselves as committed. And he
then requires that best scientific theory to be regimented into first
order predicate logic in order to reveal its ontological commitments.
Science speaks of things and as such they are members of the domain
of quantification, and the Quinean (and the scientific realist) move is
to say that whatever is in this domain will provide our ontology. Thus
quantification is said tobe themeanstodisplayontological commitment.
Quine takes all statements in natural language to be (in principle at
least) regimented into a quantified first order logical statement which
will manifest its ontological commitments. After specifying which sen-
tences are fit for ontological commitment in natural language, namely
those in our best scientific theorizing, the next step in Quine’s strategy
is to search through terminological resources in formal language to
2 I take that this is standard scientific realism. For examples that follow
this definition see J.J.C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); R.N. Boyd, ‘On the Current Status of the
Issue of Scientific Realism’, Erkenntnis 19 (1983), 45–90; M. Devitt,
Realism and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); A. Kukla, Studies in
Scientific Realism (Oxford: OUP, 1991); I. Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific
Realism (Oxford: OUP, 1999); S. Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science
Tracks Truth (London: Routledge, 1999); A. Chakravartty, A Metaphysics
for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable (Cambridge: CUP, 2007).
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determine what should carry and manifest such ontological commit-
ment. Quine stipulates that the bearer for ontological commitment is
the quantifier ∃ in first order logic, after eliminating all other candi-
dates. So, in stating ‘3 is a prime number’ one is actually stating
Na∧Pa which entails ∃x(Nx∧Px), which for Quine is read as ‘there
exists something that is a number and is prime’. This is how commit-
ments are derived from natural language – through regimentation,
which is intended to display the underlying logical form of our lan-
guage. We can thus deduce our ontology from the regimentation of
our best scientific theory, by looking to what is quantified over in the
domain. Therefore, to be quantified over in science is the Quinean
realist ontological criterion.
Quine does not provide any reason for ontologically loading the
quantifier ∃, nor argues for his criterion of ontological commitment,
claiming that it is ‘trivial and obvious’.3 I explore two possible
reasons why such a realist may conclude that the quantifier carries onto-
logical commitment: (1) because ∃ is a regimentation of the ordinary
language ‘there exists’ idiom and this already carries ontological com-
mitment; (2) because∃ is ontologically loaded by virtue of its semantics.
These reasons correspond to the two issues I clarify in this paper: (1)
whether quantification in natural language is ontologically committing;
and (2) whether quantification in formal language is ontologically com-
mitting. I argue that quantification in both English and first order logic
are ontologically neutral in section 3 and 4 respectively. In the next
section 2, I explore if there is anything nearing an argument in Quine
for ontologically loading quantification, looking to other elements of
his philosophical picture for clues or justification. In particular I will
look to Quine’s set theory, and his slogans about entities and identity.
2. Domain restrictions from SET, NE, and TB
Quine’s commitment to set-theoretic model theory (described as
‘SET’ below) and the following two slogans4 NE and TB contribute
to loading quantification:
SET: Domains are sets
NE: ‘No entity without identity’
TB: ‘To be is to be the value of a bound variable’
3 W.V.O. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Harvard University Press, 1992,
revised edition), 26.
4 W.V.O. Quine, ‘OnWhat There Is’,Review ofMetaphysics 2.5 (1948),
33.
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Quine’s slogan TB is intended as a descriptive tool to find out what
exists – our ontology will be made up of those things bound by vari-
ables in the best scientific theory. ‘To be’ is for Quine to be an existent
entity, and to be a ‘value of a bound variable’ is to be quantified over
in the domain. So TB states that to be existent is to be in a domain of
quantification. I reject TB as it entails loaded quantification. Theway
to evaluate TB is thus to evaluate what it means to be included in a
domain, to see whether domains are restricted to existent things. I
show how the domain may be restricted using SET and NE in
turn, and I reject these in favor of unrestricted domains. With a
neutral domain, we get neutral quantification.
2.1. Restriction from SET
For Quine, and in the standard set-theoretic version of model theory,
domains are seen as sets. Domains therefore will for Quine be re-
stricted in the same way that sets are restricted. Sets are restricted
by identity, since sets are required to have determinate identity con-
ditions. To have determinate identity conditions is for there to be a
determinate answer as to whether one set a is identical to another
set b. Set theory also tells us that sets are identified extensionally by
their members, and as such their members must also have determin-
ate identity conditions – for every member of the set, there is a deter-
minate answer as to whether it is identical to another member of the
set. Since the set-theoretic version of model theory states that
domains are sets, domains thus take on these same conditions.
Domains, and members of domains, therefore also have determinate
identity conditions. This is the restriction from SET on what can go
in a domain: all members must have determinate identity conditions.
2.2. Restriction from NE
Quine’s slogan NE states that there is no entity without identity. So
all entities must have determinate identity conditions. This may
sound similar to the restriction imposed by SET as having identity,
but this restriction posed by NE applies to only certain kinds of
thing. An ‘entity’ for Quine means an existent entity, as there are
no other entities for Quine. As such, his NE states that there can be
no existent entity without determinate identity conditions. Whereas,
SET states that there can be no member of the domain (existent or
not) without determinate identity conditions. So the restriction
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from NE on what can go in a domain is: all the existents must have de-
terminate identity conditions.
We are trying to find motivation or justification for TB, where the
whole domain is restricted to only existent things. So far, from SET
andNEwe only have the domain restricted to those things with iden-
tity. What the Quinean realist must do to get domain restrictions out
of the identity condition requirement, is to hold a biconditional
reading of NE, so that the identity restriction selects all and only ex-
istent things to be possible members of the domain.5 That way, all
things with identity must be existent, and thus restricting the
domain to those with identity also restricts to existents. The bicondi-
tional is between ‘being an entity’ and ‘having identity’, and is read as
going in both directions – not only do all existent entities require
identity, but all entities with identity require existence. So we read
NE as saying both ‘no entity without identity’ and ‘no identity
without entity’ (where entities exist). These are the two directions
for the biconditional:
Left-Right: X cannot exist without having determinate identity
conditions as in order to exist it must be determinately distinct
from other existents.
Right-Left: X cannot have determinate identity conditions
without existing as existence is required for completeness or
determinacy.
From the biconditional NE we bridge the gap between SET and TB:
SET provides us with the restriction that domains can only contain
things with determinate identity conditions, and the biconditional
NE provides us with the restriction that the only things with deter-
minate identity conditions are existents, which brings us to TB
which states that to be in a domain is to be an existent entity.
Therefore, we derive that all and only existent things can be quanti-
fied over in a domain, hence TB and why ∃ is read ‘there exists’. For
Quine, this is the natural reading of ∃, and being part of the domain is
howwe use the term ‘exists’ as this is just what ‘exists’means. Quine’s
identity constraint on domains ensures this reading of ∃, but this
5 I am not claiming that Quinean’s do hold a biconditional reading of
NE, but rather that they need to in order to motivate TB or else there is a
lack of argument for why quantification is taken to be existentially commit-
ting. It does nevertheless seem that they may hold the biconditional reading
given that they seem to hold that non-existents lack determinate identity
conditions and things with determinate identity conditions are existent
things. I discuss this further in section 2.3.
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constraint is unnecessary. I will go on to reject this constraint by re-
jecting the restriction that SET imposes (that all members of domains
require determinate identity conditions) and by rejecting the restric-
tion that NE imposes (that all things with identity are existent).
2.3. Rejecting TB via SET or NE
To burn the bridge that leads us to TB we can deny the biconditional
reading of NE, in particular by denying the direction Right-Left by
showing that non-existents can have identity and can go in a domain,
and thus we quantify over non-existents, so∃ is neutral. To do this we
need to find non-existents which meet the determinate identity con-
ditions imposed by SET. Or, we can simply reject SET by denying
the set-theoretic version of model theory that requires domains to
be sets with determinate identity conditions. To do this we need to
show that we can quantify over things that lack determinate identity
conditions. In the rest of this section I explore these options of reject-
ing either SET or NE.
Quine’s NE is motivated by his issue with the possible fat man in
the doorway.6 The problem with this man is that there is no deter-
minate answer as to whether he is identical to the possible tall man
in the doorway. Without there being a determinate answer as to
whether one is identical with another is for those things to lack deter-
minate identity. For Quine, not having determinate identity goes
against what it is to be an object or an existent entity. So the possible
fat man doesn’t qualify. For Quine this may be just a plea to stop
talking about possibilia, but it has the effect of restricting domains.
The question is whether NE is motivated by the possible fat man
being an illegitimate thing to talk about or by such talk problematic-
ally introducing him as an object into the domain as existent. If being
in the domain has no ontological significance and only signifies that we
talk of that thing then it seems unproblematic to talk of possibilia – it
seems only problematic if quantification is loaded to give you existent
possible fat men. Yet Quine’s identity constraint on domains and
its entities is defended as he thinks it affords our resultant theory a
degree of clarity and definiteness. But I hope to demonstrate that it
is not necessary to impose such a constraint, and so quantification
without Quine’s add-ons is naturally ontologically neutral.
6 W.V.O. Quine, From A Logical Point Of View (Harvard University
Press, 1961), 4.
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The biconditional NE ensures that all and only existents have deter-
minate identity conditions, and this is a substantial and controversial
claim which makes Quine’s logic heavily theory-laden. We needn’t
accept such a heavy load with our logic though, and in rejecting NEwe
can reject Quine’s ontologically loaded logic. Firstly, it is not clear that
all existent thingsmeetQuine’s identity conditions (andas such the con-
ditions are not necessary), and secondly, some non-existent things may
meet those identity conditions too (and as such are not sufficient). By
not being necessary we deny the direction Left-Right by showing that
we can have an entity without identity, and by not being sufficient we
denythedirectionRight-Leftbyshowing thatwecanhavenon-existents
with identity. So even if the domain is restricted bySET to include only
those thingswithdeterminate identity conditions, this set of thingsneed
not be a set of existent things, and thus we cannot look to the domain to
provide uswith an ontology.Determinate identitymaynot be necessary
nor sufficient for existence, and so would not pick out all and only exis-
tents, and so even if the domain is restrictedbySETtohavedeterminate
identity this may not restrict the domain to all and only existents.
In contesting whether NE is true, by seeing if determinate identity
is necessary for existence, we must cite existent things without deter-
minate identity. As stated before, to have determinate identity means
that for all a and all b there must be a definite answer as to whether
a=b. Let us consider numbers as an example. Benacerraf7 notes
there are many potential reductions from numbers to sets, but since
there is no principled way to choose between them then there is no
definite answer as to which, if any, sets the numbers are. So if
numbers exist they do not meet the condition fromNE.Many philo-
sophers of mathematics in the structuralist tradition take the lesson of
this to be that numbers exist but without determinate identity,
denying NE. Other examples to show that determinate identity is
not necessary for existents may include vague objects.8 There are
also examples in modern science of existents without having determin-
ate identity conditions, such as fermions and bosons in Bose-Einstein
statistics.9 Azzouni10 denies NE by showing that determinate identity
7 Paul Benacerraf, ‘What Numbers Could Not Be’, Philosophical
Review 74 (1965), 62.
8 See Gareth Evans, ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’, Analysis 28
(1978), for arguments against this.
9 Cie & Stoneham ‘Let the occult quality go’, European Journal of
Analytic Philosophy 5.1 (2009) 87.
10 J. Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 101.
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is not sufficient for existents as non-existent fictional things maymeet
the condition by stipulation. Thus the biconditional NE may be too
strong and would not be a constraint on domain specification, and by
rejecting the biconditional in some direction we break the argument
that leads to TB, leaving logic naturally neutral.
But if we feel compelled to allow for the biconditional NE, then in
order to prevent the restriction on our domains to only existents we
would thus have to reject SET. This would allow for things without
determinate identity conditions into the domain, and NE would
merely state that those things in the domainwith determinate identity
conditions will also be those things in the domain that exist. To reject
SET is to deny the set-theoretic version of model theory, and so is to
deny that domains are sets. It is standard to take domains as sets
however this leads to problems that may motivate its rejection
anyway. For example, when domains are sets we cannot have unre-
stricted universal quantification. This is because unrestricted quanti-
fication requires an unrestricted domain, and if the domain is a set
then this requires the set to be unrestricted. Such an unrestricted
set is a set of everything, which will therefore contain itself,
opening the way to Russell’s Paradox. So, treating domains as sets
can lead to paradox. If one wants to allow for unrestricted quantifica-
tion or an unrestricted domain, as Quine seems to (as he answers the
question of what exists with ‘everything!’), then one needs to deny
SET to avoid ending up in Russell’s Paradox. This allows for us to
quantify over things without determinate identity conditions, and
prevents the move from SET to the biconditional NE that leads us
to TB which loads ∃ in turn.
2.4. Rejecting TB via quantification
If Quine has an argument for TB it’s a poor one, depending on a bi-
conditional reading of NE, a paradoxical acceptance of SET, or an
unmotivated statement that quantification being loaded is simply
‘trivial and obvious’. We can deny SET or NE as done above to
block getting to TB, or we can provide independent reasons for
neutral quantification to show that not only is Quine’s loaded
reading unmotivated but also is not at all trivial or obvious. I will
now deny TB by looking at what quantification is in natural and
formal languages. As described earlier, there could be two reasons
why one may hold that quantification is ontologically loaded: (1)
because ∃ is a regimentation of the ordinary language ‘there exists’
and this is already ontologically loaded; (2) because ∃ is ontologically
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loaded by virtue of its semantics. These reasons correspond to the two
issues I clarify in the next two sections: (1) whether quantification in
natural language is ontologically committing; (2) whether quantifica-
tion in formal language is ontologically committing. I argue that
quantification in both English and first order logic are ontologically
neutral, and that examples of uses of quantification in natural and
formal languages provide evidence against TB and do not support
Quine’s triviality thesis, whereas neutral quantification is consistent
with the evidence.
3. Natural language quantification is neutral
In this section I attack the assumption that quantification in natural
language can be ontologically committing. I will explain why it is in-
correct to say ‘there exists’ is synonymous with ‘some’ in English11 to
show why ‘there exists’ is not quantificational and how ‘some’ (along
with other quantified idioms) is ontologically neutral. ∃ cannot re-
present the meaning and logical role of both ‘some’ and ‘there
exists’ in English (and cognates in other natural languages) since
‘exists’ is not quantificational (but rather is a predicate). Quantified
sentences have nothing to do with existence – they shouldn’t require
existence for their truth or meaning, and they shouldn’t imply onto-
logical commitment.
If ‘some’ is to mean ‘at least one existent thing’, then there will be
no difference between ‘some’ and ‘there exists’. Burgess and Rosen
for instance argue it is not easy to understand what the difference
can be.12 Priest responds that they could simply reflect on the sen-
tence ‘I thought of something I would like to give you as a
Christmas present but I couldn’t get it for you as it doesn’t exist’.13
Here, the ‘something’ cannot mean ‘some existent thing’ as it
would be contradictory. However, other quantified ‘some’ sentences
do appear to be ontologically loaded, like ‘some beers are in my
fridge’, which will be true only if there exists beer in my fridge.
Here however, it is not the ‘some’ that is giving the appearance of
11 Though I focus on English, since quantificational logic is meant to be
a formalization of idioms in a range of natural languages, my discussion has a
global scope across other languages too.
12 J.P. Burgess and G. Rosen, A Subject With No Object (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), 224.
13 G. Priest,Towards Non-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 152.
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ontological loading, rather the ‘in my fridge’ is. ‘Some’ needn’t require
existence, but to be physically ‘in my fridge’ does. Furthermore, ‘some’
cannot require existence since that would entail that we cannot talk truly
of some non-existent things without contradiction. For example, ‘some
mice have American accents’ is arguably true due toMickeyMouse, yet
we do not feel that the truth of this commits us to his existence. This is
contrastedwith ‘there do not existmicewithAmerican accents’ to articu-
late lack of ontological commitment.
Priest’s example is a variant of a famous example of Strawson’s,14
who points to a dictionary of legendary and mythical characters and
says, with regard to the characters, ‘some of these exist and some of
them don’t exist’. The seemingly loaded word here is ‘exist’, and
‘some’ must be considered neutral, to prevent the contradiction in
the second disjunct – ‘there exist some characters that don’t exist’.
To account for sentences such as this without contradiction, we
must be able to use ‘some’ in an ontologically neutral way. This
points towards the ordinary usage of quantification in natural lan-
guage to be ontologically neutral. Furthermore, there may be no
way of making sense of our fictional practice but to quantify over fic-
tional entities, and as such we must ensure that quantification is
neutral to avoid commitment to such fictional entities. Treating the
quantifier as ontologically neutral, and distinguishing ‘some’ as a
quantifier and ‘exists’ as a predicate, will gain expressive resources
for sentences which contain both ‘some’ and ‘not exist’ (like the ex-
amples above) in order to prevent contradictions.
One may protest that ‘some’ just by definition means ‘at least one
existent thing’ and these examples can thus be dealt with by being
not strictly speaking true. They could argue that all such examples
are a misuse of language that is parasitic on their use of ‘some’, and
are properly interpreted as involving a cancelling prefix to create a
more accurate sentence such as ‘in Disney there exists at least one
mouse that has an American accent’ to make it true. Those who
adopt such a reading will argue that all uses of ‘some’ are loaded
until it is cancelled by such a prefix, otherwise the sentence will
just be false if it involves non-existent things. However such a strategy
will not work for Priest and Strawson’s examples, which involve a
true sentence and a neutral use of the word ‘some’, where no prefix
will easily fit. These examples give cases when you quantify over a
domain of objects some of which are existent and some are not, so
you cannot prefix your quantification to explain what is going on.
This is since only part of the sentence will pertain to non-existents
14 Peter Strawson, ‘Is Existence Never A Predicate?’,Critica 1 (1967), 13.
360
Suki Finn
and another part of the same sentence pertains to existents, and so an
overarching cancelling prefix for the whole sentence will not do since
only part of the sentencewill require the commitment to be cancelled.
So far I have thus argued that, against Quine, ∃ cannot be a regi-
mentation of the ordinary language ‘there exists’ in virtue of it carry-
ing ontological commitment, since quantificational terms in natural
language like ‘some’ are ontologically un-committing. In the next
section I further argue against Quine that ∃ cannot be ontologically
loaded in virtue of its semantics either, since the semantics of the
quantifier in formal language are ontologically neutral. I show quan-
tification in formal languages like first order predicate logic to be
ontologically neutral, and therefore unregimented quantification in
natural language is neutral too.
4. Formal language quantification is neutral
Reading ∃ as ‘there exists’ is incorrect, as ‘there exists’ is not a quan-
tificational phrase. ∃ properly understood is simply ‘some’. The dif-
ference between ‘some’ and ‘there exists’ is that ‘some’ is an
ontologically neutral quantificational term, and ‘there exists’ is not
a quantificational term at all. ‘Some’ is about the number of things
(namely only some of them), and so is quantitative, whereas ‘there
exists’ describes the way things are (namely as existing things), and
so is qualitative. The word ‘some’ is fit for numerical quantificational
use, and ‘there exists’ is not. As a suggestion, ‘exists’ may be better
understood as a predicate, as ∃ cannot be the logical regimentation
of the non-quantificational ‘there exists’.
The reason ‘there exists’ is not quantificational can bemotivated by
looking to Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT)15. According to
GQT a quantificational noun phrase is made up of a determiner
and noun. Determiners are words like ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘a’, ‘most’,
‘five’. (Determiners, I argue, can be taken as ontologically neutral
since we can talk about five unicorns for example). Nouns include
words like ‘numbers’, ‘cats’, ‘objects’. So, it is true that the sentence
‘there is a number that is prime between 2 and 4’ is a quantified sen-
tence, but it is false that the quantifier is ‘there is’. Actually, the quan-
tifier is ‘a number’, with ‘a’ being a determiner and ‘number’ being a
noun. The ‘there is’ is part of the existential construction, and is not
15 Thomas Hofweber, ‘Innocent Statements and their Metaphysically
Loaded Counterparts’, Philosophers’ Imprint 7.1 (2007), 23, and
L. Gamut Logic, Language and Meaning (Chicago, 1991).
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part of the quantification, and sometimes is not even existential, for
example ‘there are many clever detectives, some of which do not
exist’, where ‘there are’ and ‘some’ are both ontologically neutral.
The quantification itself is neutral, located in the determiner and
noun. Therefore ∃ in logic translates to the neutral quantifier
‘some’ in English, rather than the non-quantificational ‘there exists’.
The argument for quantifiers being neutral can be strengthened by
looking at the connection between the two quantifiers∀ and ∃. Berto
asks, ‘why existential? The dual of “universal” is not “existential”,
but “particular”’.16 As such, the dual of ‘all’ is ‘some’, and not
‘there exists’. This can be demonstrated by considering the inter-
translatability between ∀ and ∃ where one quantifier is defined in
terms of the other: ∀x(Cx)=∼∃x(∼Cx) and ∃x(Cx)=∼∀x(∼Cx).
Furthermore, when we look to the numerical quantities of such
words, we can see that ∃ is 0%<n≤100% (‘some’) and so ∀ as
n=100% (‘all’) is an instance of ∃. Therefore, ∀x(φ)x→∃x(φ)x
should be a valid inference, since whatever is true of all of the x is
true of some of the x. For example, when I have eaten all the cakes
it is true that I have eaten some of the cakes. What is true in the uni-
versal case ought to carry over to the particular case. However when
the particular case is ontologically loaded in virtue of reading ∃ (in-
correctly) as ‘there exists’, then when we infer the particular case
from the universal we therefore can prove that something exists.
We can thus somehow derive ontology from logical inferences if we
accept ∀x(φ)x→∃x(φ)x as valid and take ∃ to be ontologically
loaded.”
The above inference ∀x(φ)x→∃x(φ)x is therefore taken as invalid
when you allow for domains to include non-existent things, or to be
empty, and treat ∃ as loaded. Classical logicians have responded by
not allowing for empty domains, and Quineans respond by not allow-
ing for non-existent things in domains, in order to retain the validity
of the inference and not prove the existence of the things they do not
want in their ontology. This is because if we do allow for an empty
domain or for domains to include non-existents, whilst we can hy-
pothesize about what all the x would be like in the universal part of
the inference, we cannot say anything about a particular x since this
requires existence when we read ∃ as loaded. Yet my response is
that we should take ∃ to be ontologically neutral and simply to
mean>0%, so that the inference is valid, even when the domain con-
tains non-existents (or is empty). This ensures that we cannot derive
16 F. Berto, Existence as a Real Property (Synthese Library: Springer,
2012), 21.
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ontologyfromlogic.Wecankeeptheconsistencyandinter-translatability
between∀ and∃by treating themboth as ontologically neutral,which
allows them to quantify over domains that contain whatever it is that
we speak about. And these domains can be neutrally specified by a
meta-language.
Formal languages like first order predicate logic are interpreted
with model theory. The model theory for a language is a specification
of amodel, which consists of a domain and for every 1-place predicate
an extension which is a subset of the domain, and for every n-place
predicate a set of n-tuples of members of the domain. There are
two rules for the quantifiers in our formal language of logic: (∃)
when at least one element of the domain is in the extension of the
predicate; (∀) when all elements of the domain are in the extension
of the predicate. We specify the domain, and specify the extension
of the predicates. Thus far there has been no mention of existence
or ontology in the meta-language of model theory, and so the
model is naturally metaphysically quiet. The metaphysical noise
comes through not in the quantification but in the specification of
the domain to be quantified over – if the domain is specified in a
metaphysical or ontologically loaded way then quantifying over it
will also be loaded. Quantification is only committal if the specifica-
tion of the domain in the model theory is committal. And whether
domain specification is committal depends upon whether the meta-
language in which the model theory is couched is itself committal.
Model theory doesn’t require an ontology and ensures that formal
languages have no ontological commitments, so that quantification
is neutral. Quine’s background rules for inclusion in a domain isn’t
neutral, and this is where ontology is smuggled in, through the
back door of domain specification.
In practice, whatever the natural language of English can talk about
can go in a domain. Any further restriction (like Quine’s) is therefore
not part of standard model theory. The point of looking at the model
theoretic approach to semantics is to show that it is done in an onto-
logically neutral way, and that the metaphysics is an addition that is
not necessary and may be incorrect. Quine included this addition
due to his preconception of what things exist (not including the pos-
sible fat man in the doorway). He thus looked to what he thought
existed in order to derive his loaded logic which was then used to
tell us what exists. So it seems he constructed logic to fit around his
premade metaphysical ideas. Quine’s method as such is circular (he
calls it ‘holistic’), as he decides on his ontology and molds identity
conditions to fit, then these conditions deliver ontological results.
Azzouni makes a similar remark: ‘One can’t read ontological
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commitments from semantic conditions unless one has already
smuggled into those semantic conditions the ontology one would
like to read off’17 and this is precisely what Quine does. It’s circular
to get ontology from logic given how Quine choses his logic – to fit
his ontology. We thus get a circular criterion for existing (to be in
the domain) and for being in a domain (to exist).
5. Domains in scientific theories
Azzouni argues that Quine is wrong to equate the ontology of a
science with the domain of discourse of that science, and as such it
is wrong to equate the ontological commitments of the science with
its quantificational commitments. Therefore, if TB is applied to
the sciences (which for Quine and the scientific realist it specifically
is), we will end up with incorrect results. Azzouni clarifies that some-
times domains and ontologies overlap for a scientific subject but
mostly domains include other things that are not part of the ontology,
and also may not include all things that are part of the ontology
studied by that scientific subject:
There isn’t anything, I think, that can (or should) be said in
general about the nature of the overlap (if any) between the
domain of a scientific language Ls and the actual ontology of
(or that underlies, i.e., involves the truth-value inducers of) the
phenomena being studied.18
If this is the case then this shows that being bound by a quantifier is
neither necessary nor sufficient for existence in the case of scientific
theorizing. Azzouni explains that scientists do not care for domains
to contain all and only existents:
Scientists formulate domains of discourse – and the vocabulary
items that refer to the contents of those domains of discourse –
in ways that maximize successful applications of scientific doc-
trine to phenomena studied. That what is in those domains
doesn’t – strictly speaking – exist, is of no scientific concern.19
17 J. Azzouni, Deflating Existential Consequence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 55.
18 J. Azzouni, Talking About Nothing (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 169.
19 Ibid., 216.
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For example, scientists work with idealized situations, as Leng states,
in ‘dealing with frictionless planes or in treating liquids as continuous
substances in fluid dynamics’.20 Since such things are spoken of in
science for the purpose of successful theorizing, they will feature in
our domain of quantification. Such a domain should not then be
treated as the set of things that make up our ontology, as included
in that domain are these idealized non-existent things. If scientific
realism takes quantification to be committing in this Quinean way
then the realist becomes ontologically committed to too much. But,
as Leng describes:
Quine has a story to tell about the use of such idealizations, in
order to explain why their occurrence in our scientific theory
doesn’t require our belief in their existence. According to
Quine, they are linguistic conveniences that can be replaced by
literally true paraphrases.21
However, if Quine and the scientific realist are to take all successful
cases of reference (and thus all true quantified statements) in our
best scientific theorizing as being ontologically committing, then
every case of idealization and the non-literal will require paraphrasing
to prevent being quantified over. And as Maddy has argued for, ‘it is
clear that the method of Quinean paraphrase will not successfully
eliminate idealizations from natural science’.22 Therefore, I argue
that it is also clear that the method of Quinean ontological commit-
ment through quantification will not successfully establish the ontol-
ogy from natural science. Scientific realism traditionally follows this
Quinean methodology, and takes it that we should believe in the
ontology from our scientific theories, as our scientific terms will suc-
cessfully refer to existent things. Scientific realists should drop this
Quinean use of quantification, and redefine their position
accordingly.
Quantifying over the scientific domain with quantifiers such as
‘some’ and ‘all’ is inappropriate for deriving ontology. ‘Some’ is
ontologically neutral since logic is only interested in quantifying
over a formal domain, and this has ontological significance only de-
pending on the constraints on (and specification of) inclusion in a
domain to restrict the domain. When the domain is restricted, the
20 Mary Leng, ‘What’s Wrong With Indispensibility?’, Synthese 131
(2002), 399.
21 Ibid., 399.
22 P. Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), 145.
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quantifiers will only be able to quantify over things that made it
through the constraint. Logic, without such constraints, is ontologic-
ally neutral. The constraint of being part of the best scientific theory
will have to be independentlymotivated to restrict to only the existent
things, but as others have argued it seems that the domains in our sci-
entific theories are not fit to be taken as sets of existent things.
Furthermore I have shown that first order logic needn’t be existen-
tially loaded by looking to model theory to show how quantification
stripped down is ontologically neutral. It is only in Quine’s back-
ground rules from SET and NE that restrict what can be quantified
over to give quantification ontological significance. Model theory has
no ontological commitments, showing that the domain is not the set
of existents, and as such formal languages are naturally neutral. I have
denied TB, via rejecting SET and NE and showing that quantifica-
tion is neutral, as it’s not the logic that supports loaded quantifica-
tion, it’s just Quinean rhetoric about possible fat men motivating
restrictions on domains, making them loaded. Without such a
domain restriction, quantification ceases to have anything to do
with existence. As Berto nicely summarises: ‘[Neutral] quantifiers
had better be called just quantifiers. “Existentially committing quan-
tification” is restricted quantification’.23 And what I have argued in
this paper, is that such restricted quantification to only existent
things is unmotivated and incorrect, and certainly is not ‘trivial and
obvious’ as Quine states. Quantification is thus naturally ontologic-
ally neutral, and cannot be used to derive ontology from the
domain of our best scientific theory.
Conclusion
Quantification becomes ontologically loaded when the domain that is
being quantified over is restricted to include only existent things. In
this way, the realist can then look to the values of bound variables in
scientific theories for their ontology, with the quantifier being the
signifier of ontological commitment. ∃ thus becomes ontologically
loaded and read as ‘there exists’, due to this domain restriction. But
without such a restriction, quantification ceases to have anything to
do with existence, and the quantifier ∃ should be read as ‘some’
and known as the ‘particular’ as there is nothing ‘existential’ about
it at all. I therefore conclude that scientific realism, being the position
23 F. Berto, Existence as a Real Property (Synthese Library: Springer,
2012), 72.
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that takes quantifying over our best scientific theories to be ontologic-
ally committing, is either false or requires redefining without presup-
posing such a problematic view about quantification.24
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